I am not sure if I should be amused or repulsed–but the essentials are correct for both. OK, I am amused.
Update: I had no idea until a friend notified me, but at 1:12 in this video, is, as chauffeur, Mike Munger!
Duke Professor Mike Munger will visit Wheeling this Monday, 29 February to speak about economic matters, the national economy, and state and local government. To get a sense of his style, etc., below is a clip from a presentation at the Shaftesbury Society in Raleigh, NC.
[hana-code-insert name=’Munger2′ /]
I am not sure I have ever had such a disagreement with the excellent Easy and Elegant Life, but there is always a first time. Perhaps it is the small snowmageddon that is playing tricks on me and luring me into a false disagreement. But, seriously, for GQ this is not a proper choice, and for reasons E&L partly notes in his post.
I think the crux is his claim that style and elegance can exist apart from each other. I am not so sure. Style is timeless; we ban the word fashion here. But elegance is a way, or manner of style.
Take the pics that E&L uses in his post I linked (above). Cary Grant and the Duke of Windsor are truly both elegant and stylish. There is a sense of timelessness to each of their dress (and I would put the Duke near the Dandy end of elegance and style).
I think the Duke is certainly sophisticated as a dresser, but he is also elegant. Sure, the stripes and panels look a bit loud to us. The manner he carries off the entire ensemble though is quite elegant. The only odd thing is the way he wears the tie. I would love to hear from people as to the apparent shortness of the tie with the tail obviously visible. It does seem a bit odd, but I am sure I am missing something.
Dandyism, however, mentions elegance as a part of the Dandy look. Note Tom Wolfe:
Why is the Duke (or Wolfe) more Dandy? Perhaps the Kinks will help:
At any rate, I like E&L quite a bit, but I think we disagree on Depp, style, and elegance.
I have been catching up on academic matters this semester, what with the snow days and all, and the History of Rome podcast (Add to iTunes) is, perhaps, one of the best podcasts of all time. One thing about the Itunes link to downloads is it begins at episode 25. You have to go to the website link to retrieve 1-24.
What with the mini snowmageddon that has visited us today, I took it as a portent from the gods to catch up with this excellent podcast. It never disappoints. Today I made it through the Ides of March. Many of my students know that the Ides is a high holy holiday in my household. But, I digress.
The History of Rome is the product of Mike Duncan and has been running for some years. It will end at some point this year (if memory serves). While I commend to your attentive listening pleasure, I take some quibble with Duncan who, though he has a delightful delivery style, has a real politik assessment of Rome. While it may be true that some things happened this way or that way, it is far more important to know how the Romans understood themselves. Did the Romans believe that Romulus and Remus were delivered by a wolf? Do we know Romans better by believing that the two brothers were the product of a questionable parenthood (hence the myth of the wolf)? Thus, Duncan has a bit of Machiavellian tint to his broadcasts. I am not so sure that a modern thinker/commentator provides the best color for ancient history commentary.
Regardless, if not for Duncan, I would likely not be seriously considering doing something very un-political sciencey (by modern standards), and that is offering a course on the Politics of Rome. While I am at it, why not the Politics of Greece?
There are many in higher ed who like the introduction of technology into the classroom, but I can say from experience, that it can be a distraction. Here’s a prof that makes the point of the latter.
h/t Chronicle of Higher Ed–Tweed.
To bring this portion of Locke to a much too premature conclusion, we can see how Locke influenced America in the chapters that start with the beginning of political societies. We find language in that chapter almost identical language that is in the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Essentially, we take with us into society the rights we have by nature–the law of nature follows us into the compact.
We enter society by unanimous consent–that is every individual agrees to make a compact and then after that majority rules thereafter. I probably do not have to remind people, that this has epic consequences when thinking through the morality of the southern notion of secession. If you reject the beginnings of societies as Locke has constructed it, then you reject the law of nature that undergirds it. Suffice to say, the foundation stripped out of the thought, everything else falls to the ground.
At any rate, Locke, the real one not the one who tries to play him on TV, begins chapter 9 with a list of those things that are the ends of political society:
So not very high is it? Is this really the end of society? The listing seems like a minimum does it not? To protect oursevles and our property is the end of government? Really, that’s it in total? Well, yes, that is it partly. And Locke does not seem to remain in this lowly moderated Hobbesian state for long. What I have hinted at throughout these last 3 posts on Locke is that Locke may actually not be the modern we think he is. We at least ought to hold open the possibility that Locke is really a kind of closet Aristotelian in modern form. However, he cannot write in the fashion he wants for fear of 3rd degree burns (note he never signed his name to the Treatises).
Perhaps the headline puts it too vulgarly (too simplistically), but by the time we get to §131 Locke is speaking in terms of good and evil/better and worse. We do not enter society to make our condition worse. We might say, Hobbes thought the same. However, Hobbes does not put it in quite the same way as Locke. At the end of the section he gives us much reason to dispute that headline–for he states that the end of society is for the peace and safety of the people. However, he adds, it is also for the “publick good” of the people. In the end, Locke is concerned with justice and right living, though he does not emphasize the virtues as Aristotle has done. Yet, clearly, there is something more to life than mere safety. We have to remember that Locke speaks of duties and obligation in the context of reasonable living. Locke may be setting the bar low in terms of the beginning of societies, and he may disagree with Aristotle in a few places, but, he has not therefore, omitted the requirement that men, to be happy, must live according to nature. He essentially asserts in §131 that all men aim at some good–hello book 1 of the Politics!
Thomas G. West has a nice post about locke and Hobbes, and Happiness here. He is critiquing Michael Zuckert who will be visiting WLU March 15th. Hence:
My suggestion, then, is that Lockean natural law has a “utilitarian” foundation. The laws of nature are rules of convenience that are useful to human happiness. In this respect, Locke is still in the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Hobbes, and most other major philosophers preceding Kant. Locke shares what Kant called the “eudaimonism” of that tradition, which Kant rejected, followed by Hegel and Marx. (“Eudaimonism” is “happinessism”—the view that the ultimate ground of morality and political right is human well-being.) That is, in this fundamental respect, Locke is closer to the classics, who also grounded natural right in a “utilitarian” way. In the end, according to this tradition, what is right is right because it is useful for human well being. (For example, in Plato’s Republic, book 9, and in the Protagoras, the virtues are good because they promote pleasure or happiness; in Xenophon’s Hiero, tyranny is bad because the tyrant is the most miserable of men.)
Locke’s argument for natural law and natural rights is not easy to figure out, because he never presents it systematically in one place. He touches on it in several of his books, leaving it to the reader to piece together. In fact, its foundation lies in arguments that do not even mention natural law explicitly.
I start with book 2 of Locke’s Essay. Happiness, Locke writes, “is that which we all aim at in all our actions.” Zuckert says that for Locke, happiness “is defined in terms of a negation—the absence of unease.” But this formulation wrongly equates Locke’s explanation of what motivates human choice with his account of what the goal of choice is, namely, “satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, etc.” We act, Locke says, only when we feel unease; that is, when we feel the pain of desire. But the goal of our unease-motivated actions is happiness. Happiness is something real for Locke: “the highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness.” We must, says Locke, take “care of ourselves, that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness.” Our desires often lead to short-term pleasure but long-term misery. Locke’s example is habitual drunkenness, which leads to “the loss of health and plenty.” The task of one’s own reason is to figure out which desires to pursue and which to deny. Since people often make mistakes about that, it is necessary to evaluate and rank one’s desires, and sometimes to cultivate new ones by habituation.
So we might have to go outside this book and into the Essay to get the full brunt of Locke’s natural happiness explication. There is nothing in West’s view of Locke, and I think it is the correct view, that places Locke outside the Ancients in regard to nature and happiness. West continues:
…Locke’s reasoning does not repudiate nature as a standard. In fact, it follows nature’s direct guide: “Nature, I confess, has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery: these indeed are innate practical principles which (as practical principles ought) do continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions without ceasing.” The rational pursuit of happiness also follows nature in a second sense: in determining the best path to happiness, reason must be attentive to the distinctness of one’s own nature. Different men have different natures, so there is no single path to what Locke calls “real happiness” for everyone. Locke does not mean that one can (to use the words of the U. S. Supreme Court) “define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” On the contrary, Locke insists that we “suit the relish of our minds to the true intrinsic good or ill that is in things.” If one chooses wrongly, for example by pursuing “a glass of wine” and “the idle chat of a soaking club” night after night, “by a too hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil. . . . He has vitiated his own palate, and must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows from it.”
Only by considering one’s own nature, its longings and its tastes, its strengths and weaknesses, can a rational path to happiness be found. Locke’s book on education gives many examples describing how parents should cope with children whose temperaments are bold or timid, or whose minds are quick or slow. In Locke as in Plato, the best life is the one kata ten phusin, “going along with nature,” just as one parts one’s hair with the grain and not against it. For example, if you don’t have the talent and inclination for it, trying to live the philosophic life will be a waste of time, a painful labor that produces frustration, anxiety, and boredom. It will not be pleasant. It will lead to misery, not to happiness. This is Locke’s qualified argument against the “teleological” approach of Aristotle, who posits the philosophic life as the best. Locke would answer, yes, it is best for those who have the capacity for it, but for everyone else, it is decidedly not the best.
From here he moves into the formation of government and the separation of powers. In order to live the good life, there must be certain necessary conditions met in this life. Locke emphasizes those means to be sure, but it does not mean he rejects the ends.
In interest of length, I am going to skip all this, but in class we will go through it. So, do not ignore it. Suffice to say, that the government of sparate powers is meant to secure our safety, protect our natural rights, and also secure the public good. It allows for much greater freedom than Hobbes, and certainly the entire ancient world.
Remember to comment here or via email.
Next up: the Letter of Toleration.
I had many questions today inquiring as to my take on the CPAC event that occurred over the weekend. I set out to watch a bit of it from what is available online (CSPAN had the entire library online earlier in the week), and read a few stories from the more conservative magazines to look into what “conservatives” themselves think, or thought, about the event. I put the word conservatives in quotes because I am not sure what conservatives believe the word means. There is widespread disagreement, even within CPAC, about the meaning of the word.
At any rate, I was asked about Ron Paul’s showing at CPAC, winning that straw poll. I think, as a matter of course viz polls, that it is meaningless. Reading anything into a poll where those voting are self-selected, and where the attendees to an event are self-selected means that it is unlikely representative of not only the group, but the Republican or Democrat parties. Some students today were rightly curious why this received so much news play. Interesting though it might be, it really is not much of a news story. The showing by anyone in that poll does not reflect the general population. What I found a little interesting was the fact the crowd basically booed when they found out Paul had won it:
There is not a small amount of restlessness and criticism, on the part of conservative intellectuals over people like Beck, and even Sarah Palin (who was not at the event). Conservative intellectuals seem to be dividing along the lines of expediency and populism. Beck and Palin represent the populist wing of the party, and, well, they are popular. It may be expedient to support them, but to what end? Will supporting them hurt their movement in the long run? The intellectuals seem to be saying they are too populist and hence are inexpedient forces to stitch together a lasting coalition. There could be a split before November thus mitigating the elections at the end of this year if the intellectual/activist divide on the right widens. That will be to the profit of President Obama should it occur. But, I realize that is unlikely to happen. The intellectual dissatisfaction on the right is not widespread, and many others who might be privately uncomfortable with people like Beck and Palin, will keep that concern private.
George Will delivered a great speech, according to some on the right, even if you disagree with the substance. I found the speech online, and embed it below. It is a combination of humor, wit, and intellectual assessment. It even provides a bit of temperance to the listener. The rhetoric and oratory is pretty well crafted and delivered. This is what we call a high brow speech:
CPAC does give people a view of the various interests on the right side of the isle of those who self-identify as “conservative.” A more academic discussion would include what conservatism is. Thanks to Ann Althouse, we have have Sen. Dirksen’s view of the matter (circa 1967, & below). But, we may want to save that discussion for another day. CPAC shows us the activists on the right. That does not mean they are representative of any party, but it does mean it is representative of a self-selected few.
I would be interested in hearing from others on this event.
We have tried to cover a lot of material in the Second Treatise. One thing about the Treatise, is its richness of thought. Locke is a modern to be sure, but he seems to be different from Hobbes, Machiavelli (and as we shall see), Rousseau, Hegel, and Heidegger.
Yet, there are some similarities between Locke and Hobbes in particular. Locke seems to have a pretty low view of man. While it is not as low as Hobbes, it certainly is not as high as the Ancients.
Locke, after writing that the state of nature is an “inconvenience” now contends in chapter 3, that it is a state of war. The initial goal of life is to preserve oneself from harm, but even more, from slavery. When someone has a desire to put you under his Absolute power, then a state of war exists. Something like Hobbes here? Yes, but it still seems like a moderate form of Hobbes. Nevertheless, the desire for absolute power is too uncertain for the one who power is sought over–if someone says he wants to merely make you a slave (which is against our nature), you really don’t know if that one day the master will want to kill you. No matter how you cut it, absolute power over another is anathema to the law of nature, and Locke contends that we have the right to kill the person who tries to put us under such a yoke. He even extends this to the act of thievery. We prematurely had this discussion this semester, and here Locke answers the question some had.
We may kill a person who breaks into our home because we do not know if this criminal also wants to put us under absolute control. Anyone who steals must also think that he can take anything he wants from anyone, and in any amount. It breaks the law of nature to steal because of the property we have acquired from our labor (see chapter 5). Our property is an extension of the equality principle. At any rate, the thief who would take away one’s liberty may also try to take away one’s life; therefore, that places the thief in a state of war with the person who the thief is trying to steal from. Most remarkably, Locke argues that we can have a state of war even in, or under, a compact.
Out of our natural equality–and I hasten to add Locke makes no qualifying statement about who is equal. When he says all men, he means all human beings!–comes the notion of consent. We see that the law of nature yet forbids certain things. Here it forbids us to enslave ourselves (nor may we kill ourselves). If we know what a human being is, we understand that slavery is against our nature, and that the very notion that someone thinks s/he can enslave his/her own self is irrational, or contrary to reason. Because we are equal is the reason we each have the right to consent, or not.
When it comes to property, again, the equality principle is in play. Because we work for something (even if we merely pick an apple off the ground in a common property sense) that means we own the apple and may do with it what we please in terms of using it for our benefit–like eat it, make it into a pie, whatever. Our labor, then, is an extension of us. Property ownership comes from the mixing of our ownership in our own bodies and souls, and our labor. There is much more here to discuss–the forbidding of taking too much to oneself, the development of money, and the labor theory of value (which most economists, and libertarians, reject)–but we must press on to the beginning of society.
After a chapter on paternal power, Locke pushes headlong into the beginning of societies. He addressed this briefly earlier when he mentioned his disagreement with Hooker (and Aristotle!) on man’s sociability. However, what was a vigorous disagreement turns out to be more moderated by the time we get to chapter 7. Locke contends it is not good for humans to be alone, but nevertheless, are driven into society. Is there a dual reason for leaving the state of nature: sociability and necessity?
We enter society in order to escape the state of nature, and because we are free and equal, our consent is necessary when agreeing to make a compact to form a society. This unanimous consent does not last forever, and the will of the majority is to rule thereafter.
Now, is there really such a thing as the state of nature and this type of societal beginning? Locke anticipates his adversaries by stating that even though there are no records of people leaving a state of nature and forming a government, that it nevertheless occurs this way–that compact is the beginning of society (which is not exactly an airtight defense of the actual process of leaving the state of nature). Still, we agree to come together for form a government for our mutual protection and to secure much (not all) of what we possess by nature.
Locke realizes that this form of government requires much on the people–that they be reasonable, have a sense of duty, obey the law of nature, etc. We shall pick up on the development of this much freer society next.
During a discussion of the decline of parties in America, a class discussion morphed into the value of parties, the decline of state representation (via the 17th Amendment) and the idea of progressivism. One student noted that she could not see really anything wrong with the situation today, and expressed some criticism at going back to, say, an older time placing the Constitution more in its original form. That would mean, a repeal of the 17th Amendment for starters. The question, or objection, from the student is worthy of consideration!
One thing to note: there are progressives in both parties; both parties have a progressive streak. Obama, for example, self-identifies as a progressive. But, so is John McCain. We could add to the mix people like Hillary Clinton, who forcibly claims the title, and yes, Sarah Palin and Mike Huckabee. All of these people sport a certain progressive ideology and to varying degrees. Now, of course, just because someone might say s/he is a progressive does not make it so, but neither does someone who never really claims to be a progressive, yet might have progressive ideas. Suffice to say, there are many of the right who claim to be progressives, and many of the left that claim the same. Republicans claim TR for their own good form of progressive, while Democrats point to Woodrow Wilson.
The most important thing here is to determine what is a progressive? What does progressivism entail? There are a couple of very informative books by RJ Pestritto on progressivism. We must wade through some of the ideological (and partisan) positioning in deciphering what makes a progressive. There is a lot of political theory behind progressivism. It has become so ingrained in our conscience, that it is almost natural to assent to the progressive impulse.
Perhaps the most important source of progressive thought comes from the European historicists. The source of the intellectual thought of progressivism comes out of 18th-19th century thinkers. People like G.W.F. Hegel are rather important here in their influence of political thought. These thinkers did not believe there were any “self-evident truths.” This means that truth was relative, or that truth evolved. There was a certain hearkening back to Jean Jacques Rousseau in all this–that most everything we know in society is a sort of temporary concoction that undergoes change as time marches on. As Rousseau contended, one of the things that is artificial about this life is our very language.
Hegel essentially believed that we were progressing through time, and that, as we progress, we end closer to perfection. Thus, what we think might be true today, could be discovered untrue later. This process of evolution leads to the conclusion that there is no objective truth in life because all things evolve. We are all a product of our time and cannot hope to understand truly the past. But, we can say we are far more advanced than those who lived before us.
There is a bit of liberation in all this. The individual self becomes the arbiter of right and wrong. The individual becomes more important than a class of humans. A person is a complete self when that person’s mind regards the self as self. Whew! Complicated stuff to be sure, but it means that, say, being fully human as the Ancients thought, does not require a life according to nature. Why? Because the German Idealists, like Hegel, believed there really was no nature, no forms, no common noun that points to a immutable and unchangeable idea. Knowing comes from action and interaction with others, not necessarily though contemplation and Socratic dialectic. It is this last thing that has continued to influence our modern k-12 education in the U.S. But, the concept of the individual is an ever evolving process as well. This has led to radical skepticism.
In the American formation, progressives believed that the U.S. Constitution was defective, in part because it was stuck in time.
One thing to note about the progressive movement is that they believed the Constitution was too much an impediment. Indeed, they thought that the American Founding was deeply flawed because the American construction kept the U.S. from keeping up with the times.
More than anyone, Woodrow Wilson advanced the new Progressive theory of human nature and human institutions and the corresponding Progressive critique of the principles of the American Founding and the Founders’ Constitution. Wilson, who was president of Princeton and of the American Political Science Association before becoming President of the United States, was the first Chief Executive to openly criticize the Constitution, once comparing it to “political witchcraft.” So hostile was he to the self evident truths of the Founding that in a 1911 address he remarked, “if you want to understand the real Declaration of Independence, do not repeat the preface.”
Wilson above all others deserves credit for the notion that the Constitution is a “living” or “evolving” document. As he wrote in 1908, “Government is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin.” Insisting that the Constitution does not contain any theories or principles, Wilson argued that the Constitution has a “natural evolution” and is “one thing in one age, another in another.” “Living political constitutions,” he wrote, “must be Darwinian in structure and in practice.”
The question for us is if they (Hegel, Rousseau, TR, Wilson) are correct. Are we in a sort of historical trajectory that cannot really be escaped from? Does the government need to conform to this path? We ought not get hung up on Darwin here, as there is a line of thought that places Darwin within the context of natural right. However, the progressives are not speaking that way. They believe natural right a kind of myth.
The consequence of all this is unlimited government. But before we consider that, we should adress this quandary. To many, the very democratic developments in our politics–the rise of primaries, decline of parties, use of recall, initiative, referendum–have all been positive developments. On the surface, it probably seems like progressivism and democratic reform do not go together. They do, as Prof Sidney Milkis notes:
“More than any single leader,” the Progressive thinker and editor Herbert Croly wrote, “Theodore Roosevelt contributed decisively to the combination of political and social reform and to the building up a body of national public opinion behind the combination. Under his leadership as president [from 1901-1908], reform began to assume the characteristics, if not the name, of progressivism.” By bestowing national prominence on progressive objectives, T.R.’s presidency ushered in a new form of statesmanship—one that transformed the chief executive into “the steward of the public welfare,” giving expression and effect to the American people’s aspirations for social improvement. Roosevelt’s concept of leadership and his great talent for taking the American people into his confidence made him virtually irresistible to reformers. “Roosevelt bit me and I went mad,” the journalist William Allen White wrote about his participation in the Bull Moose campaign. He was not alone. Jane Addams, the renowned social worker who seconded Roosevelt’s Progressive Party nomination for president (the first woman to nominate a major candidate for the presidency), declared that reformers supported T.R.’s candidacy because they viewed him as “one of the few men in public life who has responded to the social appeal, who has caught the significance of the modern movement.” He was a leader, she added, “of invincible courage, of open mind, of democratic sympathies, one endowed with power to interpret the common man and to identify himself with the common lot.”
Yet as Robert La Follette, one of T.R.’s critics, objected, “No party successfully organized around a man. Principles and issues must constitute the basis of this great movement.” Thus the Progressive Party’s political program was especially important in defining its collective mission; these proposals unified the movement and ensured its lasting legacy. Above all, the party stood for “pure democracy,” that is, democracy purged of the impure influence of the special interests. The party platform’s endorsement of “pure democracy” was sanctified as a “covenant with the people,” a deep and abiding pledge to make the people the “masters of their constitution.” Like the Populist Party of the late 19th century, the Progressives invoked the Constitution’s preamble (“We the People”) in proclaiming their purpose to strengthen the federal government’s regulatory authority over the society and economy. Unlike the Populists, however, Progressives sought to hitch the will of the people to a strengthened national administrative power. Animated by the radical agrarianism that had accompanied the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian assaults on monopolistic power, the Populists had sought to mobilize the states and the Congress for an assault on the centralizing, plutocratic alliance between the national parties and the large corporations or “trusts.” By contrast, the Progressives, with their “gospel of efficiency” drawn from the latest discoveries of political and social science, could not abide the Populists’ localized, backward-looking democratic faith.
Today, scholars puzzle over the apparent contradiction between the Progressives’ celebration of direct democracy and their hope to achieve more disinterested government, which seemed to demand a powerful and expert national bureaucracy. But Progressives came to see that the expansion of social welfare and “pure democracy,” as they understood it, were inextricably linked. Reforms such as the direct primary, as well as the initiative and referendum, were designed to overthrow the localized two-party system in the United States, which for generations had restrained the growth of the national government. By the same token, the triumph of “progressive” over “pioneer” democracy, as Croly framed it, would put the American people directly in touch with the councils of power, thus strengthening their demands for government support and requiring the federal government to expand and transform itself in order to realize the goals of Progressive social welfare policy.
The government power over our daily lives should be expanded to deliver benefits, and bring to heel certain interests. This required a decrease in the power of those interests–like the parties–and an increase in the power, or authority of the government. Democracy would expand, but how to harness the less constrained majority? The leader.
If history is truly moving in a direction, then we need the government to have more authority to keep up with it. And, we need a leader who can see the future, so to speak. We need a leader who is able to direct the will of the people–or at least guide it–to where history wants us to go. Note Woodrow Wilson on this count:
For he is also the political leader of the nation, or has it in his choice to be. The nation as a whole has chosen him, and is conscious that it has no other political spokesman. His is the only national voice in affairs. Let him once win the admiration and confidence of the country, and no other single force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily overpower him. His position takes the imagination of the country. He is the representative of no constituency, but of the whole people. When he speaks in his true character, he speaks for no special interest. If he rightly interpret the national thought and boldly insist upon it, he is irresistible; and the country never feels the zest of action so much as when its President is of such insight and calibre. Its instinct is for unified action, and it craves a single leader. It is for this reason that it will often prefer to choose a man rather than a party. A President who it trusts can not only lead it, but form it to his own views.
This is serious stuff, and a serious departure from the Founding. No longer is the protection of rights a goal, but getting stuff done is the new goal. Presidential powers do not flow from the Constitution, but from the unfiltered will of the people, and the power of the individual President. This is significant because, well, what happens when the protection of the rights of man are no longer a goal of legitimate government? Separation of powers, checks and balances, Federalism all suffer in the wake of progressive populism. It could also give rise to factions. A large, and unlimited, government is needed with few checks and balances in the way, to make government able to keep up with history. We cannot allow history to pass us by.
For students thinking about these matters, it deserves serious thought which argument is most persuasive to you? The Federalist Papers, or the progressive spirit? A government, and a people, looks different pending that choice. The choice is yours. Which is more persuasive?